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INTRODUCTION 
In Japan private railway companies are common and play an important role in passenger 
transport, especially in urban areas. They are financially independent and in most case their 
rail operation makes profits. The considerable number of private railways provides adequate 
urban public transportation services without governmental support system. Their total costs 
that include investment costs are covered by fare-box. This contrasts with most systems in 
other industrialized countries. In most industrialized countries public ownership, subsidies, 
operating deficits, and inefficient operation are general recognition when policy makers 
discuss the provision of the urban public transportation. 
 
As a matter of principle, the public transport system has two basic objectives that are expected 
to achieve simultaneously: to sever the public interest and to be efficient. However, the two 
objectives can sometimes be in conflict. Thus, the policy must focus either on the public 
interest (‘mobility first’ principle) or on profitability at the outset. Basically speaking, the 
Japanese rule has been that urban railways and other public transport bodies should pay for 
their own costs, while making exceptions in special cases. That is, the national government 
still maintains a strict policy of “self-supporting” (or “full-cost principle”) for public 
transportation. Under these policy schemes, operator may promote commercial objectives. 
Given this principle, the national government set up several special subsidy programmes for 
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special cases, mainly for the new line construction projects, which need massive investment 
costs. But, these subsidy programmes had been applied the lines provided by public and semi-
governmental bodies, but not for private railways. 
 
The Japanese case provides us with a role model that may lead to increased private provision 
of public transport services. However the system meets the problem that the subsidy 
programmes has been not applicable for most efficient rail operators: private railways. That is 
to say, to get the funds from the governments to ease the financial problem of the new line 
construction, the local community have to employ the public (or semi-public) operator; even 
people know that the public operator has lack of enough management capability especially in 
terms of efficiency. On the other hand, even if a need exists for rail services, for example to 
accommodate residents of new towns or to make it possible to through operation, it is not 
easy for the private sector to enter the market. A huge investment for a private railway 
company would be risky. 
 
Furthermore, because of a steady increase in auto ownership and use, many railway operators 
face the declining markets. Therefore it becomes more difficult to thrive the rail business even 
for the most efficient management under the self-support principle. But, basically, 
governments tend to deny supporting private railways financially; even everyone knows that 
private railways are more efficient than public counterparts. Thus when the rail company to 
decide to cease the rail services of a line, the community again have to use public railways, 
even if the rail services has more social benefits than transformed bus services. 
 
To solve these policy problems, discussions have started to search the smart way of subsidy 
programmes which might be applicable for private (directly or indirectly) and dose not have 
disincentive for the privates’ efficient management system. There are a few attempts to solve 
problems. At the moment, these attempts tend to use the operation-infrastructure separation 
type idea even that people recognize the disadvantages of this treatment. 
 
This paper we first provide a brief overview of rail transport in Japan, mainly for urban. The 
paper then explains the self-supporting principle, subsidy programmes in Japan and 
consequences of the rule that prevent private railways from being granted subsidies. Finally, 
we will show a couple of schemes to tackle these problems and discuss the efficiency of the 
arrangements that allow private railways to benefit indirectly from subsidisation, such as 
separate infrastructure companies. 
 
A SKETCH OF URBAN RAIL TRANSPORT IN JAPAN 
This section gives an overview of regulatory policy and status of the Japanese railway 
industry.  First, we will describe types of rail license in Japan and categorize railway 
companies. Then we will give a brief over overview of the performance of private railway 
companies and their diversification strategy. 
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Entry regulation 
Before a railway company may provide railway service, it must first acquire a rail license in 
Japan, subject to approval by the Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport.  The duration 
of the license is unspecified, so that once a railway company is established, it may continue to 
operate indefinitely, as long as it creates no serious management problems such as safety 
threat. However, it is logical consequence to terminate rail services if the rail operation is no 
longer financially sustainable, though a railway company have to report the Ministry (and 
relating local governments) one year before to cease supplying service. Because private 
railway companies on a commercial basis operate most rail services, it is possible that the 
company transform one of (or, in some cases, all) rail services to bus operated services by 
themselves if the community agree this transformation.  
In April 1987, when the Japan National Railway was privatized and divided into separate 
railway companies, hereafter referred to as Japan Railways (JRs), three kinds of railway 
licenses were created, as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Kinds of Rail Service Licenses in Japan 
Kind of 
license 
Type Basic Description 
Class 1 Operation-infrastructure 
integrated provider 
Enterprises that provide rail passenger and/or freight services 
while holding their own rail infrastructure 
Class 2 Operation provider Enterprises that provide rail passenger and/or freight services 
using rail infrastructure owned by another organization 
Class 3 Infrastructure provider Enterprises that build rail infrastructure for sale to a class 1 
enterprise, or enterprises which own infrastructure and rent it to 
a class 2 enterprise 
 
Most Japanese companies hold a Class 1 license, as they provide service operation on rail 
infrastructure they own themselves. This license, then, is granted to vertically integrated 
railway systems, while both Class 2 and Class 3 rail licenses are issued to companies with 
vertically separated rail systems. Class 2 licenses are for companies operating on borrowed 
tracks while Class 3 licenses are for companies providing the infrastructure that Class 2 
license holders use. Holders of Class 2 and Class 3 licenses are rare. The Japanese Class 2 
railway company which borrows infrastructure is different from operation-only railways in 
Europe, which typically own no infrastructure. Almost all Japanese Class 2 rail holders, in 
addition to borrowing track from outside companies, own their own tracks on different lines 
as well, so that these companies are in fact both Class 1 companies because they own their 
own infrastructure where they operate their own trains elsewhere and Class 2 companies 
because they borrow other companies’ rail tracks along parts of their total line hauls. The 
roles of such companies usually involve extended operation to some specific facility or area 
such as an airport or suburban new town, or interconnection among different rail operators 
within a city.  
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Operators 
In Japanese passenger transportation, private railway companies play an important role, 
particularly in large metropolitan areas.  Although, trends indicate an increase in auto use and 
ownership and stagnant or gradually declining rail ridership, rail transport maintains a 
reasonably high modal share of total trips in Japan.  In 2000, on a countrywide basis, the rail 
modal share of motorized transport in terms of passengers was 26%. If only the three large 
metropolitan areas are considered this figure increases to 49%1.  And the share of private 
railways of all rail transport was 41%.  Especially, the percentage of Osaka (‘Kei’-‘Han’-
‘Shin’) metropolitan area was 49%, which was highest.  Even the lowest private rail share in 
rail passenger market was 38% (Tokyo metropolitan area). 
 
There are 170 railways (which include tram, monorail and automated-guided-transit 
operation) operators providing passenger service in Japan. Some of these companies are Class 
3 operators.  In most case the operators only provide passenger services.  The Ministry 
utilizes eight categories for passenger rail operators; JR (6), ‘Majors’ (15), ‘Jun-Ote’ 
(Medium) (6), ‘Minors’ (112), TRTA (1), Municipals (12), monorail (9), and AGT 
(Automated Guideway Transit) (9). 
 
Table 2: Classification of Passenger Rail Operators in Japan 
Operators  Legal Classification  Ownership  Service Type  Main Service Areas 
Large private Private Corporation  Private   Urban Large Metropolitan areas 
   (in most cases) (e.g. Tokyo, Osaka, etc.) 
Medium private  Private Corporation  Private   Urban  Large Metropolitan areas 
    (e.g. Tokyo, Osaka, etc.) 
Small private  Private Corporation  Private   Local From large to small urban 
   (and Urban) areas and rural area 
Transformed Private Corporation  Public-Private   Local  From large to small urban 
Third Sector Railway    areas and rural area 
JR  Special Corporation  Public and  Inter City and  six Regions in Japan 
  Private Urban 
TRTA Special Corporation  Public*   Urban  Tokyo 
Municipal Public Organisation  Public (local  Urban  Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya 
  government)  and 6 other large cities 
Monorail Private Corporation Public-Private  Urban Large Metropolitan areas 
  partly private  and large urban area 
AGT Private Corporation Public-Private  Urban Large Metropolitan areas 
Source: Mizutani (1999) Table 1.1 
Note: The author made several changes from original tables.   As we explained, there are some exceptional 
cases, especially in the ownership categories. 
                                                 
1 In 1990, these numbers increased to 28% and 51% respectively. In 1980, the modal split of rail transit in Japan 
was 35% and 53% in metropolitan areas. In 1970, the percentages were 40% and 55%.  
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‘Majors’ provide service mainly in Japan’s three large metropolises with the exception of 
Nishitesu, and are all pure private companies.  ‘Jun-Ote’ provides services in and/or on the 
outskirts of metropolises but not to the extent of the ‘majors’. Three of those firms are quasi-
private (49% or less of the shares are owned by the public sector). ‘Minors’ consist ex-JNR 
and authorized-Shinkansen (bullet train) construction related ‘Transformed Third Sector 
Railway’s’ (42 which include one Class 3 operator and all are quasi public: in most cases 51% 
or more the shares are owned by the public sector) and small local operators which provide 
rail services in the less densely populated cities of Japan (‘small-private’, 70 which include 
eight Class 3 operator. Some of 70 companies are public-private mixed companies but in most 
cases private companies), TRTA (Teito Rapid Transit Authority; now it calls Tokyo Metro 
Co. Ltd.) provides the metro (underground) rail service in Tokyo area and is the special 
corporation (it due to fully privatized in FY 2007). Municipal provide metro (in most cases 
underground) services, except three companies which only run tram system, and all municipal 
are pure public corporations (authority). Lastly, monorail and AGT are Quasi-public (51% or 
more the shares are owned by the public sector) with a few exceptional cases. 
 
A majority of the Japanese private railway companies started operations around the 1900’s 
and have long business histories. However, unlike the financial problems and bankruptcies 
that plagued operators in most other countries, most private Japanese railways continue to 
operate successfully to this day.  
Private railways and their diversification strategy 
The ‘Railway Nationalization Law’, which went into effect in 1906, restricted the activities of 
the private railway firms.  Under the law, private firms were restricted to the local (regional) 
services and the use of or creation of lines that basically didn‘t interfere with government 
lines directly.  Thus it travelled through areas with relatively limited populations. While 
private firms anticipated that railway operations could be self-supporting, limited population 
bases forced companies to ‘generate’ a steady ridership for rail operations. This led to the 
greater utilization of a business diversification strategy. 
 
Japanese private railways have long been permitted to operate non-rail businesses in addition 
to the rail business. To be precise, there has been no regulation to do non-rail businesses as far 
as it has been rational behaviour as a business entity. Therefore, it might be rational and 
understandable "corporate" behaviour, given the steady but low profitability of the rail 
business and its "vulnerability" to political intervention. In fact many private railway 
companies engaged in non-rail activities from the outset.  
 
After many decades of experience in a multitude of services, the private railway companies of 
Japan have proven to be highly successful. The highly positive reputation of Japanese 
railways is mainly due to these private companies.  Their success can easily be measured by 
the penetration of railways in everyday life. They have achieved a high social status by 
offering not only impeccable transport services – to a large degree due to extensive preventive 
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maintenance, highly trained personnel, quality control systems and strong customer 
orientation – but also by diversifying and bringing forth quality amenities, products and 
services in their region. The importance of non-transport activities is brought forth in table 3.  
In addition to in-house diversification, most private railways also form multi-company 
groups.  These companies do not see themselves merely as diversified companies, but rather 
as ‘life-style developers’. (van de Velde 2002). 
 
Table 3: Revenue percentages of the majors and Minors (1995) 
  Revenue percentages 
FIRM 
  
Number 
of Firms 
  
Diversification 
index4) 
  
Operating level 
profitability1) Rail Division 
Transportation 
Division 
Real Estate 
Division 
Other Business 
Division 
Majors 15 42.87  115  51% 11% 21% 17% 
Minors 63 40.433) 101 38% 32% 13% 17%   
Note: 1) operating level profitability is defined as operating profits divided by operating costs (including depreciation).
2) the numbers are simple average of each category companies 
3) the weighted average of DI for Minors was 59.55. 
4) DI = (1-√ (∑Pi2))*100 where Pi is the percentage of revenues attributable to a discrete business 
 
The diversification is not to randomly diversify but to diversify with the strict goal of 
increasing rail ridership2. The focused, methodical, long-term strategy has given the transport 
providers a reliable base of ridership.  In simplistic terms the flow of development proceeded 
in the following way.  In most cases, they started the diversified operations, including housing 
development, amusement parks & other attraction facilities and lights & electricity, form the 
very beginning of the firm’s history.  These residential development and leisure facilities 
helped to build up the rail passenger traffic in the vicinity of the rail lines. In sometime, access 
services between rail lines and those developed areas (or facilities) located at a distance from 
the rail infrastructure were created to vertically support railway operations as well as to 
operate as independent entities. Stations were developed to meet the needs of riders who pass 
daily through the stations. Later, private railway companies extend their business targets not 
only railway passengers but also the people who live near the railway lines.  Station 
development included the construction of department stores, office buildings, the 
development of other retail space and other consumer-related businesses. By the 1920’s the 
pioneers in railway diversification proved successful, and soon others followed. National 
Government did not stop this, probably because this is purely commercial decision and it dose 
not cause big troubles. 
 
On the other hand, National Government made the rule: ‘Railway Accounting Regulations’ 
(Tetsudo Kaikei Kisoku). Under the regulations, a railway company is forbidden to allocate 
rail and non-rail costing at its own discretion. Regulations dictate how to allocate costs for 
common facilities and administration. Therefore, an intentional cross-subsidy strategy, 
whereby a railway company charges low fares at the expense of non-rail businesses and vice 
versa is unlawful and thus avoided.  So, in Japan, rail business activities and non-rail business 
                                                 
2 Please refer; Shoji, (1993), Killeen and Shoji (1997), Shoji, (2001), Shoji, and Killeen (2001)., (2002). 
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activities are strictly separated by this official manner.  
 
The absence of cross-subsidisation does not mean that there are no interdependencies. Besides 
the strong focus on the customers’ needs, a very important reason for the success of both rail 
and non-rail activities is the synergy created between the two activities. Japanese private 
railway companies are capable of following such a flow which enables companies to 
internalise some of the externalities that were created by the development of their 
infrastructure and to attract passengers to railway operations. In addition, as a company 
moves along the experience curve, valuable knowledge and experience can be utilized to 
expand or to enter new markets.  As a result, Private initiative allows the development of 
long-term strategies that are not possible under political cycles.  It appears that diversification 
is a rational strategic choice. 
 
SELF-SUPPROTING PRINCIPLE AND PRIVATE RAILWAY 
In principle, Japanese national government policy dictates the self-supporting principle even 
for the small privates. The basic rule has been that urban railways should pay for their own 
operation and infrastructure cost. Therefore, when we calculate the ratio of fare revenue to 
operating costs that exclude items such as depreciation and interest on debt, it is greatly 
exceeding 100%. Although there is some on-going discussion relating to this point, most 
private companies operate on a pure commercial basis. Therefore, the private railway 
providers receive, at most, nominal subsidies while providing government coffers with 
corporate tax revenues.  
Fares and determination of service levels 
Passenger fare levels of all companies are regulated by the Ministry based on the Railway 
Enterprise Law. There are tow important points in fare regulation. First, rail fare must be 
approved by the Minister of Transport3. Second, the Japanese railway industry is based upon 
the full cost principle.  The rail fare should cover rail costs including the operator’s profits4. 
Generally speaking, railway enterprises are expected not to receive subsidies. 
 
To be precise, the Ministry approves “fare ceilings (maximum fare levels)” based on the 
aggregate cost method. The Ministry must approve basic (ceiling) rates such as price per 
travel length and price per travel zone, which applies for regular ticket and pass uses. On the 
other hand, many kinds of other tickets such as serial tickets, group discount tickets, express 
                                                 
3 This is an important point to remember when we compare the present situation with the fare approval of the 
Japan National Railway (JNR) before privatisation, when JNR’s fare had to be approved by the Diet 
(parliament). In case of public (municipal) rail companies, they need the approval of the local council. 
4 Public companies dose not pursue commercial profits.  
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charges, and entrance fees are decided by the railway companies, although the companies 
have to report to the Ministry. 
 
As we mentioned, the full cost principle is used to calculate fair price (ceiling).  
Furthermore, two different systems, the cost accumulating method for small private railways 
and public sector railways, and the rate-base method for major private railways, are used to 
calculate the rail fare. To help remedy the lack of competition-induced efficiency 
improvement among railways, the Ministry has introduced a yardstick competition scheme 
into its evaluation of applications by railway companies for fare increases, a scheme which 
has been used since the 1970s for the fifteen large private railways (Mizutani, 1997 and 
1999).   
 
Formerly, the yardstick method was applied only to the 15 major private railway companies 
and the TRTA. But from 1997, it has been expanded to include the six JR passenger 
companies and nine municipal owned underground systems. As a result, the yardstick 
method is now applied to railways carrying about 95% of all rail passengers in Japan (Okabe 
2004).  The comparison organized in each of three categories: major private railways, JRs, 
and underground systems.  The new method is still criticized, but we may need a little more 
time and experience to assess the new method before we change it5. 
 
In Japanese public transport provision, the operators decide the level and type of services 
offered, though there are regulations of basic elements of service standards.  In general, a 
railway operator can determine train schedules.  Rail operators are required to publish their 
time and fare schedules.  Every station has information on train schedules and rail users can 
easily obtain information.  This information, especially in case of JRs,  is also easily available 
through commercial booklets such as ‘Timetable (Jikokuhyo)’, published by JR and the travel 
agency JTB6.  
Performance of private railway companies 
The reason for the success of Japanese mass transit providers is likely due to the fact that 
numerous railway providers are privately owned, decide their own levels and types of services 
and have broadly diversified their business.  Because private railways have to provide and pay 
for their infrastructure and operating costs, all private rail operators have to admire the market 
trends and the customers’ demand seriously.  As a going concern, they have to be committed 
in the long-term to the community they serve.  Thus, private railway companies have taken 
initiatives in promoting systematic regional development in and around the areas, which their 
networks serve, and have developed in close harmony with trackside communities to the 
                                                 
5 There have been few attempts to fare increase under the new methods.  But many experts claim it is to 
simplistic to calculate the base costs.  In fact, in each cost equation, it only uses a couple of variables.  Moreover, 
the Ministry neglects the difference of service quality among companies. 
6 Some “major” private railway companies also sell their own timetable book. 
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mutual benefit of both.  Depend on passengers for income instead of the government, private 
railways have had to treat passengers as customers and thus provide extremely reliable, 
punctual, safe, reasonably fast and convenient service.  In addition facing competition from 
the automobiles, buses as well as other railway companies, private companies had to 
constantly improve efficiency to survive. 
 
Some researchers attribute the unique success of the Japanese private railways only to the 
existence of extremely high-density markets with a history of lag of motorization compared to 
other first world countries, though, nowadays, its level of car ownership are comparable to 
them.  But this view is too simplistic, as we explained.  It is and has been the innovative use 
of diversification strategies that has allowed the private railway companies in Japan to build a 
stable ridership necessary to not only survive but to thrive. In fact, the privatisation of the 
government owned and operated Japan National Railway in 1987 was initiated in large part 
due to the successful examples provided by the private railway companies.  
 
Furthermore, there are many private rail companies, which operate successfully in less 
populated areas in Japan.  Table 4 shows the passenger density and number of profitable 
private railway companies which have traffic densities of less than 40,000 passenger-
kilometres per route-kilometre per day7.  16 companies that have traffic densities of 8,000 – 
40,000 (passengers) were almost all determined to be profitable.  Each ratio of the revenue 
from rail operation to the cost of rail operation (including depreciation) of these companies 
was more than 100%, except one company (97%).  If the density was more than 2,000, the 
ratios of all companies were more than 80%. 
 
Table 4: Passenger density1) and number of profitable private railway companies  (1995)  
RAIL DIVISION PROFITABILITY 
DENSITY1) NUMBER OF COMPANIES 100% - 95 - 100% 80 – 95% less than 80% 
COMPANYS 
WITH 
OVERALL 
OPERATING 
PROFITS 
COMPANYS 
WITH 
CURRENT 
PROFITS  (after 
taxes) 
20,000 – 40,000 6 5 1 0 0 6 3 
8,000 – 20,000 10 10 0 0 0 9 9 
4,000 - 8.000 13 8 1 4 0 5 4 
2,000 - 4000 13 5 3 5 0 6 4 
1,000 - 2,000 21 1  4  5  11  8 5 
TOTAL 63 29 9 14 11 34 25 
Note: 1) density is defined as the average number of passenger-kilometres per route-kilometre per day. 
     2) two companies (Sanyo and Kobe Dentetsu) use 1994 data due to effects of the Great Kobe Earthquake. 
     3) there are seven companies that also provide rail freight services. But only three of them, their freight 
       revenues exceeds passenger revenues; Chichibu (density was 6,300, rail profitability was 84%), Mizushima  
      (4,300, 96%) and Sangi (3,000, 102%).  Gakunan (1,400, 81%) has almost same weight of both services. 
 
                                                 
7 These companies consist of 1 ‘major”, 2 ’medium’ and 59 ‘small’ private railways.- 
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SUBSIDY POLICY FOR URBAN RAILWAY 
As we noted, the Japanese basic rule has been that urban railways and other public transport 
bodies should pay for their own costs, while making exceptions in special cases. Thus, 
Japanese public transportation is based on the full cost principle, with few subsidies available.  
Although the national government recognizes the importance of rail system in urban area, 
they have been reluctant to give public money freely. They might worry the consequences in 
term of efficiency for society that urban railways being granted subsidies. However, if some 
areas suffer from insufficient public transportation, then facilities may be obtained through 
subsidy.  However, probably because of this user-pay principle, national government set the 
subsidy programmes which are only applicable for new line construction, though there are 
some partial subsidy programmes for other investment projects for specified rail facilities 
such as, reconstruction of natural disaster, facility modernization (provided to rural railway 
operators to the equipments in order to enhance the safety and streamline the management), 
upgrading railway crossing, and anti-earthquake investments etc. There is no subsidy 
programme for operating accounts8.   
Financing rail infrastructure for private railways 
Because private railways play an important role in Japanese urban transport, urban rail 
investment has tended to be the domain of the private sector, even after the war. Funding for 
railway investment is to a large degree obtained through commercial loans. But there is a 
limited level of government supports available under strict terms. 
 
The Development bank of Japan has offered somewhat low interest loans from 1959 onwards 
to assist private companies with, for example, grade separation work at railway crossings, line 
extensions, and platform extension. However, most experts recognize the impacts of this 
treatment have been nominal. 
 
In 1972, the national government (Ministry pf Tranport) instituted a program to support the 
construction of urban private railways, whereby rail lines could be financed by a state-owned 
entity, called the ‘Japan Railway Construction, Transport and Technology Agency’ (former 
Japan Railway Construction Public Corporation). After completion, the rail lines are turned 
over to the private operator, with the construction cost to be repaid over a period of 25 years, 
thus this does not represent a grant (investment subsidy), but only a financing arrangement. In 
accordance with this arrangement, national government set the subsidy program for interest 
payment.  It covers part of the interest to be paid on the funds needed for the construction of 
line only for this type construction. But, again, most experts recognize the impacts of this 
                                                 
8 Until 1996, there was the subsidy scheme to cover part of an operating deficit for eligible smaller private 
companys,  those which operate in rural areas. For JNR reform related quasi-public companies, there are some 
subsidy. 
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treatment have been minimal9. Anyway, small portion of new lines constructed use this 
Corporation as most companies choose to finance the construction of new lines by using their 
own resources. 
 
As Japanese law prohibits cross-subsidisation within private railway companies, both rail and 
non-rail activities must be profitable in their own right. As a result cross-subsidisation is not 
feasible. However, private companies have also been very successful in internalising the 
positive externalities which stem from railway development, as we explained. 
Construction subsidy programmes for public sector rail 
The Ministry of Transport10 established the ‘Underground Construction Scheme’ established 
in 1978, which provides subsidies for the construction of urban underground railway systems 
by municipal governments and TRTA.  National and local government provides a subsidy 
corresponding to “70%” of eligible construction expenses equally, which corresponds to 
roughly half the total construction cost11.  From 1993, public-private mixed (joint-stock) 
railway companies, which 50% or more the shares are owned by the public sector, also 
eligible to get this construction subsidy, though until 2001, the amount of subsidy is decreased 
in proportion to the public share of shares.  
 
In 1972, for the construction of new suburb commuter line, the ‘New-Town Construction 
Scheme’, which subsidy corresponding to “36%” of eligible construction expenses by 
national and local government equally, established by the Ministry of Transport12.  But if the 
new line constructed by private railways or quasi-private (which 49% or less the shares are 
owned by the public sector), this subsidy scheme are not applicable, 
 
There is one more subsidy system, which we need explain here13.  The subsidy programme 
                                                 
9 This interest payment assistance scheme subsidy for interest payments in excess of 5 % (at the moment) for 
investments. In recent years, as market borrowing interest rate has been less than 5 %, this scheme offers almost 
nothing. 
10 As a result of the administrative reform of the government in January 6, 2001, the Ministry of Land 
Infrastructure and Transport came into being, as a result of the administrative reform of the government.  This 
new ministry was a consolidation of these former ministries or organizations: the Ministry of Construction, the 
Ministry of Transport, the Land Planning Agency, the Hokkaido Development Agency, and the Okinawa 
Development Agency.  But to simplify the explanation, we use old name in this section. 
11 Originally, this subsidy system started as the subsidy scheme which covers the part of interest to be paid on 
the funds for construction in 1962. 
12 From 2002, the subsidy rate decreased to 30%.  From 200?, Airport access lines also applicable and only for 
Narita airport line the subsidy rate increased to 66%. 
13 There have been two more subsidy programmes for the urban rail construction.  The one is ‘Interest-free 
Loan’ (for urban railways).  This is provided by the railway subsidy section of JRCTTA to the railway 
construction section of the JRCTTA for new urban lines and for conversions to double-track lines.  But, in fact, 
the most budged of this Interest free loan has spend for the construction of Tsukuba Express line project 
(Metropolitan Intercity Railway Co.) which will start to operation in August 24, 2005.  The rest of budget went a 
few JR line projects.  The other programme is the subsidy for improving the tram running environments.  But its 
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for monorail is established in 1974, and from 1975 it is also applicable for AGT. The 
programme provides subsidies for the construction of urban monorail or AGT systems by 
municipal governments and quasi-public (public-private mixed companies which 50% or 
more the shares are owned by the public sector).  The official name of this programme is 
‘Monorail Road etc. Construction Scheme”, but in general it calls ‘Infrastructure Construction 
Scheme’.  It covers “infrastructure part” (that is elevated structures under the running tracks) 
for monorail and AGT and the subsidy cannot exceed 59,9% of construction costs no matter 
how worthy the project.  Officially, there is no room of negotiation to exceed this ceiling 
value (at the moment, 59.9%);  even real infrastructure costs exceed this value.  
 
This programme set by the Ministry of Construction. The ministry had been regulated the rail 
projects when railway operators provide services by using regular roads (such as tram system).  
After the lengthy discussion, Monorail and AGT fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Construction14.  To be precise, the money goes to the road authority (local governments). 
Irrationality of on-going subsidy programmes 
Thus, most rail subsidy schemes in Japan are for public (or quasi-public) railways.  As for 
subsidies for urban railways, the public sector can get subsidies for construction of new 
undergrounds, monorail, AGT, or ‘new-town’ lines but the private sector can get only interest 
payment assistance on new or expanded lines, which has nothing contribution given the low 
market interest rates.  Furthermore, the programmes have the feature of deciding the rail 
system that each programme targets respectively.  Needless to say, these specified subsidy 
system that established by national government is lack of flexibility.  Even after the 
consolidation of the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Construction, there are no real 
movements to integrate these rather fragmental subsidy programmes, though there have been 
long discussions on these issues. 
 
Table 5 Construction Subsidy Programmes and Eligible Operator 
      
 Rail Operator  Schemes 
Public Public-private mixed Private 
Road 
Authority 
Underground Construction 
Scheme { {＊     
New-Town Construction 
Scheme { {     Heavy Rail 
Interest Payment Assistance 
(via JRCTTA)   { {   
Monorail / 
AGT 
Infrastructure Construction 
Scheme       { 
Tram (Light 
Rail) 
Improvement of tram 
running environments       { 
 *)  From 1993, public-private mixed railway companies, which 50% or more the shares are owned by the public 
                                                                                                                                                        
amount is rather limited even from Japanese standard. 
14 The monorail/AGT operator also must acquire a license that approved by the Ministry of Transport (now, 
Railway Division, Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport).  Ministry of Transport regulate its fares and 
service standard etc, as the ministry does for ordinal rail. 
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sector, also eligible to get this construction subsidy, though until 2001, the amount of subsidy is decreased in 
proportion to the public share of shares. 
 
Table 6 Truck Space and Subsidy Programme 
 Underground Elevated 
Surface 
(own right of way) 
Surface 
(mixed traffic) 
Underground 
Construction Scheme (insufficient)* (insufficient) (exceptional) 
Heavy Rail 
 New-Town Construction Scheme New-Town Construction Scheme  Rail 
‘Linier Metro’ Underground Construction Scheme (insufficient) (insufficient)  
Monorail / AGT (might be possible)** Infrastructure Construction Scheme   Tam and 
Rubber tyre 
Tram (might be possible) (might be possible) (insufficient) Improvement of tram running environments 
Note) “Insufficient” means .there is only nominal subsidy scheme for this case and “might be possible” means there is a movement to 
expand the coverage for this case.  ‘Linier Metro’ is the underground which use linier induction motor driven system. 
   :  Because of technical reasons, it is impossible to use this space. 
    *:  There are several cases which cover by the Underground Construction Scheme.  But in all cases, Elevated section is a small part 
of Underground networks. 
  **:  From 2002, Infrastructure Construction Scheme also covers this case, though there is no achievement example. 
 
Thus, to get the funds from the governments to ease the financial problem of the new line 
construction, the local community have to employ the public (or semi-public) operator; even 
people know that the public operator has lack of enough management capability especially in 
terms of efficiency.  Moreover, because the big amount of subsidy comes in case of 
underground, monorail and AGT, the community might choose one of these systems; even the 
real total costs are expensive comparing with ordinal surface-rail or LRT. 
 
NEW FINANCING SCHEMES 
Given the “self-supporting” principle, the Japanese government set up several special subsidy 
programmes for special cases, mainly for the new line construction projects, which need 
massive investment costs. But, these subsidy programmes had been applied the lines provided 
by public and semi-governmental bodies (quasi-public), but not for private railways which is 
more efficient operator. 
 
Thus, to get the funds from the governments to lighten the financial problem of the new line 
construction, the local community have to employ the public (or semi-public) operator; even 
people know that the public operator has lack of enough management capability especially in 
terms of efficiency. However, even if a need exists for rail services, for example to 
accommodate residents of new towns or to make it possible to through operation, it is not 
easy for the private sector to enter the market. A huge investment for a private railway 
company would be risky.  
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There are several attempts to tackle these problems. We will explain here two cases. Both 
cases use public-private mixed company and rail infrastructure-operation separation. 
A case of Kobe-Kosoku 15 
One of the attempts to tackle these problems has been to establish the public-private mixed 
company to avoid the business risk of the rail service market. The first notable attempt was 
initiated at the local level.  
 
Kobe Rapid Transit Railway (hereafter referred to as “Kobe Kosoku”), which since 1968 has 
been providing service to connect the networks of four different and separately owned railway 
companies in the Kobe area. Before the construction of Kobe Kosoku’s tracks, there was no 
railway line connecting the east-west corridor (Osaka with Himeji), except for the Japan 
National Railway (JNR) line and a portion of Kobe City’s trams.  There was also a lack of 
efficient service in downtown Kobe, where four large railway companies (Hankyu, Hanshin, 
Sanyo, and Kobe Dentetsu) were providing rail services but their lines were not connected to 
each other, much to the inconvenience of Kobe users.   
 
To address these shortcomings in the city’s rail system, Kobe Kosoku was created. Although 
the original idea to connect east-west corridor proposed by two private companies (Hanshin 
and Sanyo) in 1920s16, official movement for Kobe Kosoku was started in 1946, in the wake 
of the near destruction of Kobe in World War II bombing.  Plans for the construction of Kobe 
Kosoku were included in a so-called Rebuild Kobe City Master Plan. The company was 
formally established in October 1958, and began providing rail services ten years later. 
Simply put, Kobe Kosoku, a company held jointly by the private and public sectors, owns 
tracks which interconnect four private railway companies and which it lets out to them for use 
in their rail operations.  
 
                                                 
15 Mizutani and Shoji (2004) 
16 In fact, both companies applied the license to extend the line to Minatagomawa 
(midpoint of both terminals) in 1924 and city council approved in 1926.  
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Figure 1. Kobe Kosoku and Major Railways in Kobe 
Source: Mizutani and Shoji (2004) 
The three types of rail licenses described before did not come into existence until 1987, when 
the Japan National Railway was privatised and the Railway Enterprise Law enacted.  Before 
the three types of licenses were created, all railways held the same license and were expected 
essentially to be both infrastructure-owning and rail service-providing companies. But 
because of the shortness of the lines (total network length is 7.6km) and the situation, it was 
judged irrational to establish the new integrated rail company which have own tracks, rail 
stocks, drivers and depot, even if the city established the new municipal underground 
company which is eligible to get construction subsidy.  
 
Thus, from the beginning Kobe Kosoku held its own tracks, though it did not own its own 
trains. Kobe Kosoku “contracted out” its train service to the four older rail companies. The 
ministry of Transport permitted this arrangement as a special case. Compared with 
underground systems in Japan, Kobe Kosoku has been a for-profit organization, because the 
majority of shareholders (60%) are private companies. While subway systems consume 
government subsidies, Kobe Kosoku began issuing dividends to its shareholders as early as 
1978. 
 
Kobe Kosoku is a unique company in threefold. First, the stock of Kobe Kosoku is jointly 
held by the original four railway companies (40%) whose services it connected, by the Kobe 
city government (40%), and by other private companies (20%)17. Although the capital stock 
covers a small part of total investment costs 18 , investment from the city facilitate the 
financing of the construction of the facility. Furthermore, because Kobe Kosoku has been 
partly held by its operation companies, so that the opinions of operation companies are 
reflected in railway decisions, and most involved usually behave with mutual benefit in mind. 
When Kobe Kosoku makes important decisions about investment plans or the coordination of 
                                                 
17 In precisely, the total amounts of the stocks of four private railways exceed by 40 stocks which is 0.025% of 
the total stocks.. 
18 National government set the guidance to the amount of capital stock for new line: 10% of rail construction 
costs at that time (later, it became to 20%). 
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train scheduling, it can freely take into account the opinions of its operation companies, 
because they are partial owners.   
 
Secondly, Kobe Kosoku is an infrastructure-owing company.  But, compared with a typical 
infrastructure company whose relations with the rail users are presumably made unnecessary 
by the presence of the service-providing company, Kobe Kosoku has a direct relationship 
with the consumer (passengers).  This means that Kobe Kosoku shares the revenue risk. 
While Kobe Kosoku appears to be an integrated railway company, it is in actuality purchasing 
rail operation services from operation companies by contract. 
 
Finally, to avoid the business risk of the initial investment in rail infrastructure, Kobe Kosoku 
obtained money through a kind of value capture techniques. Four private railways, Kobe 
Kosoku and City of Kobe made agreement to pay “connection benefit fee” from 1968 to 1973.  
The amount of this fee decided by business negotiation. Thus four private railways transfer 
part of the possible financial gain arising from direct rail connection. The total amount of 6 
years of four rail companies is 3 billion yen.  Therefore Kobe Kosoku got in average 500 
million yen annually. Roughly speaking, 500 million yen meant 24.7million passengers in 
1970 average fare revenue and this was almost 30% of annual passengers. 
A new scheme for private railway extension  
The national government established the class 3 license for infrastructure-only company. One 
of the intentions of this new system was to contribute to initiate new rail service in urban 
areas.  In fact, the private and public sector have recently started to establish new rail track 
companies to enter into new markets, leaving the operations to the private sector. For example, 
Kintetsu applied for this kind of rail license for a new town (Keihanna new town in the 
suburbs of Osaka and Kyoto). Not only this new established infrastructure-providing 
company got investment from public sector, it also gets public funds via ‘New-Town 
construction scheme’.  
 
From 1993, public-private mixed railway companies, which 50% or more the shares are 
owned by the public sector, also eligible to get ‘underground construction subsidy scheme’, 
but the amount of subsidy is decreased in proportion to the public share of shares.  However 
in 2001, the national government changed this rule. Hereafter, the public-private mixed 
company also gets full subsidy as public company.  There are two lines that are now under 
construction to utilise this scheme and both situate in Osaka area. Keihan use this scheme for 
a new line, which run through Nakanoshima (downtown area of Osaka and its western part is 
now under re-development stage).  Another case is Hanshin for an extension to Namba (it 
allow through operation between Hanshin and Kintetsu).  Both lines will be opened in 2009. 
 
These two construction projects have pretty much similar characteristics and procedure. The 
stock of the infrastructure company is jointly held by the private rail company (about 33.35%), 
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which will become Class 2 operator, by the Osaka city government (33.33%), by the Osaka 
prefecture government (16.67%), and by other private companies (about 16.65%).  So, 
although the stock is jointly held by the public sector and the private sector equally, the 
biggest share owned by the private railway company. Then the CEO of the infrastructure 
company comes from the private rail company. 
 
Table 7 shows the financing scheme of this new arrangement. Before the construction started, 
the private railway company (Class 2), local governments and the national governments 
estimated the total amount of truck construction costs of the new line and reached the 
agreement. Then, total costs are divided two categories: the eligible costs for underground 
construction subsidy scheme (about 95-97%) and the not-eligible costs for the scheme (about 
3-5%)19. In case of the Keihan Nakanoshima new line, the former cost is 144 billion Yen 
(about 1,050 million Euro) and the latter is 6 billion Yen (about 40 million Euro). Capitol 
stock covers 20% of the costs of each of both categories. Under the underground construction 
scheme the national governments and local governments covers in total 53.2% of the eligible 
costs for the scheme. Rest of this costs (26.8%) obtained through loans. Concerning the latter 
category 80% obtains through loans.  
 
Table. 7.  Financing Scheme for Truck Construction (new Scheme) 
Total Construction Costs 
Eligible for Subsidy 100% Not eligible for Subsidy 100% 
Public Sector  10% Public Sector  10% Capital Stock 
Private Sector 10% 
Capital Stock
Private Sector 10% 
National Government 25.2%*
Subsidy 
Local Governments 28.0% 
Self-
Financing Loan 26.8% 
Self-
Financing Loan 80% 
 Note) In general, total amount of 'not eligible for subsidy' is about 3-5%.  Total construction costs dose not 
includes rolling stocks, related investments on existing section, and other related expenses. 
* In theory, the share of national government is 28.0% (=80%*0.7*0.5).  But, because of the fiscal reason, 
national government decreased 10% of its portion (25.2=28.0*0.9).   
 
The costs of related investments on existing section, procurements of new rolling stocks and 
other related expenses (such as public relations costs, system development costs for automatic 
fare collecting system and sign system costs) are not included in the total truck construction 
costs.  The private railway company pays all these costs. 
 
POSSIBLE LESSONS FROM JAPANESE EXPERIENCES 
Private railway companies have the reputation that they have made vigorous efforts to 
                                                 
19 This costs include interest payments during the construction period and some other miscellaneous expenses 
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increase passengers, expand automation in the rail business, and introduce other efficiency 
measures in Japan. On the other hand, even the publicly owned underground systems are 
eligible to get the subsidisation for construction and, in most cities, get the local ‘subsidy’ for 
operation accounts20, they experience political intervention at any level of decision-makings21 
and accumulate operating deficits in most cases, though the national government also apply 
the full-cost principle. 
While private railway companies are financially independent, they have full responsibility for 
their decisions regarding networks, operating patterns, schedules and fares. In short, they are 
autonomous commercial entities. Under the self-sufficiency principle for local public 
transportation of the national government, there have been few changes in the rules of the 
games.  Private railways are permitted to develop and operate on their own, given the pre-
defined principle and some regulations. Thus they can allow having a long-term, commitment 
to the community it serves.  In fact, many people argued that private railways have succeeded 
to develop in close harmony with trackside communication to the mutual benefits of both.  
These long-term relationships via all kind of businesses contribute to be able to effectively 
design and improve their services.  
 
Compare with public railway companies, the urban private railway companies in Japan are 
autonomous organizations which will have full responsibility to provide public transportation 
service to the public under the commercial principle. Japanese people enjoy the highly 
reliable, punctual and comfortable rail services without tax burden.  Private railways have 
achieved a high social status by offering not only impeccable transport services but also by 
diversifying and bringing forth quality amenities, products and services in their region.  
 
However, because of the commercial principle, private railway companies tend to reluctant to 
expand their network in urban area, given the huge costs and/or un-profitability. There are 
cases that the rail lines are closed, though there are many private rail companies which 
operate successfully in less populated areas in Japan. Even un-remunerative means the market 
deny the economic value of the services, it might happen that its social benefits are well over 
its costs. In fact, given the “self-supporting” principle, the Japanese national government set 
up several special subsidy programmes for special cases, mainly for the new line construction 
projects, which need massive investment costs. But, these subsidy programmes had been 
applied the lines provided by public and semi-governmental bodies (quasi-public), but not for 
private railways.   
                                                 
20 As we noted, there are no national subsidy scheme for operation.  Under the Japanese local government 
system, the power and financing ability is rather limited and are controlled strictly by the national government. 
One of the ways of subsidy is the ‘concessionary fares rebate for elderly and handicapped people’. So it might be 
better to say fare compensation. However, the amount of rebate tends to have little relation to the actual number 
of elderly and handicapped passengers. 
21 It is true that no private railway welcomes intervention from the authorities. For example, Hankyu, which is a 
major private railways based in Osaka, turned down a subsidy from the government to rebuild its rail track 
damaged by the Great Kobe Earthquake in 1995. Hankyu chose to finance reconstruction of its rail track itself in 
order to avoid possible governmental strings attached to such a subsidy. 
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For people who live in the countries which has the mobility first principle, Japanese 
arrangements for rail construction seems to be somewhat beside point. However, these are 
very important arrangements to utilize private railway companies. It allows private railways 
to benefit indirectly from subsidisation. To prevent to have negative effects on their efficient 
management system, we need to check the various points. From our observation, we might be 
able to present some important points or keywords. 
 
The idea of infrastructure-operation separation might create conflict between the two 
functional sectors. In order to avoid the conflict between operators and infrastructure, shares 
of Kobe Kosoku are held by operation companies so that the opinions of operation companies 
are reflected in railway decisions, and most involved usually behave with mutual benefit in 
mind.   
 
Furthermore, Kobe Kosoku is not simply a rail infrastructure provider but is rather more like 
an integrated railway company, which purchases rail operations by contract.  This means that 
Kobe Kosoku cannot determine its fare revenues alone but must work in cooperation with its 
train operating companies, quite unlike a typical infrastructure company, which charges 
infrastructure fees regardless of the conditions of fare revenues. Thus, Kobe Kosoku shares 
the revenue risk with operation companies. 
 
However, the case of Kobe Kosoku has disadvantages, besides Kobe Kosoku was not eligible 
for the national subsidy scheme. Firstly, even if Kobe Kosoku is specializing in mainly 
maintaining infrastructure, the maintenance cost is no different from the costs of integrated 
systems. Our econometric calculation shows this result (Mizutani and Shoji 2004).  In fact, 
some railway experts claimed that the number of staffs in electricity maintenance department 
seems to be too many22.   
 
There is the problem that the company might be lack of ability to make large investments.  In 
the event of Great Kobe Earthquake, Kobe Kosoku found itself with woefully few resources 
to deal with the crisis. It had been focusing on track maintenance and traffic controlling, 
whereas in the aftermath of the earthquake, a huge labour force was suddenly required for 
rebuilding. Same kind anxious might be happen for financing.  
 
The new scheme for Keihan and Hanshin made progress on these points. The underground 
construction subsidisation programme is applicable for this scheme. The public sector involve 
mainly in funding the construction phase and the construction. Although the stock is jointly 
held by the public sector and the private sector equally, the biggest share owned by the private 
railway company (Class 2 operator at this new section, which run through operation from its 
existing line). Then the CEO of the infrastructure company comes from the private railway 
company. The private railway company has incentive to streamlize the construction costs and 
                                                 
22 We heard this assertion from Mr Nomura (Hankyu) and Mr Sugiura (Hanshin) 
independently.  
 
 
 
 20  
 
 
keeps the last to say on the management issues of the infrastructure company. In any case, the 
Class 2 company should redeem the total construction costs to the infrastructure under the 
scheme.   
 
Thus the scheme entrusts to private business as much as possible and minimise the public 
intervention, which might increase the construction costs. The scheme also take care of to 
stop conflicts between the infrastructure company and the operation company. And the 
resource problems of the infrastructure company can be avoided. 
 
These new arrangements might be possible to extend the other cases of investments, such as a 
devastating earthquake exceeding the risk levels normally envisaged by private companies, a 
universal design instruments, and a new line costruction. Concerning the operating subsidy, 
this is not an easy question to answer, though most Japanese think un-remunerative services 
might mean that the community are not support.   
 
Finally, as we noted before, Japanese systems meets another type of problems.  The national 
programmes have the feature of deciding the rail system (and ownerships) that each 
programme targets respectively.  Needless to say, these specified subsidy system is lack of 
flexibility. If the national government transfers more power to local governments, it might 
contribute to overcome the problems. The case of Kobe Kosoku gives a good example. 
However, we should mind that the local governments tend to adopt the plan to extend their 
own underground lines instead of utilising the existing private railway lines. In fact, partly 
because the Japanese subsidisation system, we have several cases. 
 
The Japanese case provides us with a role model that may lead to increase rational private 
provision of public transport services. To utilize the private efficient management ability, we 
need to construct the well-considered and structured arrangements. From our discussion, we 
think following keywords are essential: autonomy, entrust, mutual benefits, long time 
commitment, and the ‘self-supporting’ principle. 
 
. 
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